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a Melitz-type model of international trade with unionized labor markets
and heterogeneous workers we show that: (i) there is a threshold level of
UB where all trade gains are destroyed, (ii) this threshold di⁄ers between
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11 Introduction
The overwhelming majority of the trade literature concludes that trade liber-
alization is no Pareto-improvement. Despite the gains of trade on the macro-
economic level, there are losers on the microeconomic level. In particular, low-
skilled workers are worse o⁄because of the destruction of unskilled jobs (see Bis-
courp/Kramarz, 2007) and the reduction of their wages (see Bazen/Cardebat,
2001). In a recent study, OECD (2008) states that economic inequality raises
social fears, which is one of the most important reasons for resistance to in-
ternational integration. Moreover, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) argue that due
to the unequal distribution of trade gains, policy-makers could be forced to in-
crease the degree of protectionism, which clearly countervails the gains of trade.
Public policy therefore focuses on ￿nding an applicable redistribution scheme
(henceforth RS) that bene￿ts the harmed groups without destroying the gains
of trade.
To compensate the losers, there are two policy instruments: Wage subsidies
in order to countervail the decrease in the wage rate for low-skilled workers and
unemployment bene￿ts (henceforth UB) in order to attenuate the loss of income
due to the job destruction. The former however is empirically rarely observed.
On the contrary, adjustments of the UB are one of the core issues in the political
debate for the redistribution of trade gains. While it will be good news for
low-skilled workers, its implications on the macroeconomic level are critical.
UB enhance the average wage rate, which reduces ￿rms￿labor demand, output
and welfare. Thus, compensating the losers comes at a price: the (partially)
destruction of trade gains. Moreover, in a general equilibrium, the government
must also take into account the implications of the UB￿funding. The arising
question is then whether the choice of the ￿nancial form may amplify, mitigate
or even avoid the destruction of the trade gains.
The contribution of this paper is to investigate the impact of three di⁄erent
￿nancing forms of the UB: (i) a wage tax paid by employees, (ii) a payroll tax
paid by ￿rms and (iii) a pro￿t tax paid exclusively by exporters. The structure
of the funding ensures that these taxes do not incriminate all workers and ￿rms
identically but harm on average the winners of trade. Employed workers bene￿t
in terms of their real wages, ￿rms bene￿t on average because of increasing
productivity and exporters bene￿t by rising market shares. In order to compare
the di⁄erent opportunities, we abstain from mixing these three kinds of taxes
but instead analyze their e⁄ects separately. To be more precise, we investigate
their implications on the composition of ￿rms, (long-term) (un)employment and
aggregate output in a positive, comparative static analysis. Furthermore, we
analyze the impact of the RS on welfare ￿de￿ned as output per capita. If welfare
decreases, trade gains are destroyed, otherwise, trade gains are recovered.
Our model builds on the framework of de Pinto and Michaelis (2011) who
combine the Melitz (2003) model of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous
￿rms with the existence of heterogeneous workers (i.e. workers are di⁄erent
with respect to their abilities; see Helpman et al., 2010a, b) and unionized labor
markets (see Layard/Nickell, 1990). We additionally incorporate a government
2sector and introduce the di⁄erent RS. Starting point of our analysis is an open
economy setting with relatively high trade costs and without the interference
of the government. Afterwards, trade will be liberalized via a reduction of
the trade cost. Still without the government￿ s intervention, this leads to the
unequal distributed trade gains mentioned above. At this point, the government
implements the UB as RS and chooses one of the three taxes for its funding.
There are three mechanisms driving our results. First, the well-known ￿rm
selection e⁄ect (henceforth FS) varies the distribution of active ￿rms and thus
average productivity of the active ￿rms. Second, the equilibrium (un)employment
rate is determined by the interplay between the union￿ s wage setting behavior
(i.e. the target real wage) and the ￿rm￿ s price setting schedule (i.e. the fea-
sible real wage; henceforth FRW). Third, a ￿rm-speci￿c interval of abilities
prevails. We assume that each ￿rm sets a minimum quality requirement for
its workers while each worker chooses a reservation wage, and he or she does
not apply for jobs paying less than that. Firms with high entrepreneurial pro-
ductivity demand workers with high abilities, they pay high wages and thus
attract high-ability workers. Firms with low entrepreneurial productivity have
a low minimum quality requirement, they pay low wages and thus do not recruit
high-ability workers but only employ low-skilled workers.
Our main results are derived from a partial and a total analysis. Investigating
the di⁄erent policy instruments in the partial analysis separately yields four
results: First, a higher level of the UB improves the workers￿fallback income,
the union￿ s target real wage increases, employment and thus welfare decreases.
Second, the wage tax funding is neutral at the aggregate level. If the wage
tax rate rises, unions enhance their wage claims to hold the net wage constant.
However, the fallback income of all workers decreases and the unions￿target
real wage declines. In the equilibrium, both e⁄ects exactly o⁄set each other; the
wage tax has no impact on the goods and labor market outcomes.
Third, the payroll tax increases ￿rms￿marginal costs reducing the FRW.
Employment immediately declines, which also lowers welfare. Fourth, the pro￿t
tax decrease average net pro￿t, market entry thus becomes less attractive and
the number of ￿rms and goods shrinks. This implies, however, an increase in the
demand for each variety, revenues of all ￿rms increase and less productive ￿rms
can stay in the market and produce; the FS becomes weaker. Consequently,
labor demand for low-ability workers increases. From this channel, employment
rises, but this e⁄ect interacts with the negative implications of the decline in
the average productivity: marginal costs increase, the FRW and employment
decrease. Looking at the aggregate output, the decreasing average productiv-
ity dominates all potential positive employment e⁄ects, welfare unambiguously
declines.
In our total analysis, we investigate the impact of the three RS mentioned
above. Combining the implications of the partial analysis, we ￿nd that for the
three RS there is a threshold level of UB where all trade gains are destroyed,
but this threshold di⁄ers with the UB funding: First, UB ￿nanced by a wage
tax destruct the gains of trade because of the negative impact of the UB. Due
to the wage tax neutrality, however, the intensity of the trade gains destruction
3is relatively low. Second, UB ￿nanced by the payroll tax amplify the gains of
trade destruction in comparison to the wage tax case because of the payroll tax
implies only negative e⁄ects on employment and welfare; the threshold for the
level of the UB, where the trade gains are completely destroyed is lower.
Third, UB ￿nanced by the pro￿t tax destroys also the gains of trade. Due to
the positive impact of the pro￿t tax on low-skilled labor demand, the threshold
for the level of the UB, where the trade gains are completely destroyed is higher
compared to the case of a payroll tax. However, this channel does not dominate
the wage tax neutrality; the threshold level of the UB is lower compared to the
wage tax funding. As a result, we obtain an unequivocal ranking for the chosen
funding of the UB: 1. wage tax, 2. pro￿t tax, 3. payroll tax.
In the literature, the investigation of RS of trade gains in general has a long
history. For instance, Dixit and Norman (1986) show in a full employment trade
model that commodity taxes compensate the losers and recover the trade gains.
If, however, labor market imperfections are considered, this result may no longer
hold. Brecher and Choudhri (1994) argue that under a binding minimum wage
and hence the existence of involuntary unemployment, the compensation of the
losers would fully negate the gains of trade. In a similar vein, Davidson and
Matusz (2006) create a dynamic model with search frictions. Since workers are
dislocated in their framework because of trade liberalization, they investigate
the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policy interventions, namely wage subsidies, employment
subsidies, UB and training subsidies. As a result, welfare reduces in all cases,
but using wage subsidies to compensate those workers who bear the adjustment
cost and using employment subsidies to compensate those workers who are not
able to leave the shrinking sector because of trade liberalization would minimize
total welfare losses.
Davidson et al. (2007) claim that fully compensation for the losers of trade
could even be urgent to guarantee free trade independent of the conservation
of trade gains. In the absence of market interventions, liberalization could be
blocked. They create a referendum-based model with a continuum of hetero-
geneous agents. These agents choose between liberalization and protection,
choose whether to compensate dislocated workers and choose the compensa-
tion instrument. It can be shown that the opportunity to redistribute increases
the probability of liberalization independent of the agenda￿ s order. However,
in some parameter constellations, the "right" sequencing of decisions is neces-
sary for this outcome. Agents have to commit to the compensating before the
liberalization decision, otherwise protection is chosen.
In comparison to our approach, the mentioned studies have at least one
shortcoming: they stick to the assumption of homogeneous ￿rms. Thus, all
￿rms are exporters, all ￿rms gain from trade and the empirically relevant ex-
port selection e⁄ect is missed. In modern trade theory, this gap is ￿lled using
a Melitz (2003)-type model of heterogeneous ￿rms and monopolistic competi-
tion. A common extension of this model is the incorporation of labor market
imperfections (see Helpman/Itskhoki, 2010; Helpman et al., 2010a, b and Fel-
bermayr et al., 2011 for the implementation of search and matching frictions;
see Egger/Kreickemeier, 2009a and Davis/Harrigan, 2011 for using e¢ ciency
4wage approaches as well as de Pinto/Michaelis, 2011 for the introduction of
unionized labor markets).
However, only a few studies implement a RS. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009b)
extend the Melitz (2003) model using a fair-wage e⁄ort model and introducing
a government sector. The RS consists of an absolute per capita transfer to all
individuals and a proportionally pro￿t tax. In this setting, it can be shown
that a tax constellation exists that equalizes the income distribution without
eliminating the gains of trade completely. In a very similar framework, Egger
and Kreickemeier (2012) introduce UB ￿nanced by proportional income tax.
As a result, employment and welfare decreases. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)
model search and matching frictions as well as UB ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax.
Then, welfare could either increase or decrease where the latter can be observed
for the majority of the parameter constellations.
One additional remark: our welfare measure only consists of the aggregate
wage income, which equals a constant share of the aggregate output because of
the monopolistic competition setting. While this criterion is su¢ cient for our
positive analysis, the welfare function is incomplete if the government norma-
tively aims to ￿nd an optimal RS. In particular, the implications for income
distribution should be included. As a prominent example for this purpose, It-
skhoki (2008) derives an optimal redistribution rule resulting from maximizing
a speci￿c welfare function with income inequality as its negative argument.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, we
present the set-up of the open economy model at the sectoral level, while the
general equilibrium is derived in section three. In section four, we discuss the
implications of the government￿ s political instruments separately. Section ￿ve
provides the simulation results of our three RS under consideration of the gov-
ernment￿ s budget constraints. Section six concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Set-up
Our framework builds on the standard monopolistic competition model with
heterogeneous ￿rms by Melitz (2003) and its extension to trade unions and
heterogeneous workers by de Pinto and Michaelis (2011). We consider an open
economy setting with two symmetric countries. The economy consists of two
sectors: a ￿nal goods sector produces a homogeneous good Y under perfect
competition and a monopolistic competitive sector with M ￿rms produces a
continuum of di⁄erentiated intermediate goods.
The production technology of the ￿nal goods producer is assumed to be a









































where P is the corresponding price index. V denotes the mass of all potentially
available goods Mt and ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties (￿ > 1). The index im denotes import variables. Variables without
an index refer to the domestic market only. We suppose Y to be the numØraire,
which allows for the normalization of the price index: P ￿ 1. The demand
for variety ￿ can be derived from the pro￿t maximization of the ￿nal goods
producers:









In the intermediate goods sector, there is a continuum of ex-ante homoge-
neous ￿rms. Firms enter the di⁄erentiated sector by paying a ￿xed entry cost
fe > 0 (measured in units of ￿nal goods and equal across ￿rms). fe can be
interpreted as the irreversible investment for research and development all ￿rms
have to incur. After paying, fe is sunk. In the subsequent Melitz-lottery, ￿rms
observe their entrepreneurial productivity ￿, which is Pareto-distributed with
G￿ (￿) = 1 ￿ (￿min=￿)k for ￿ ￿ ￿min = 1 and k > 1.1 In addition to the entry
cost, there are ￿xed production costs f > 0 and fx > 0 (measured in units of
￿nal goods and equal across ￿rms). f and fx can be interpreted as the costs of
forming a distribution and servicing network in the domestic and foreign mar-
ket, respectively. These types of ￿xed costs are called beachhead costs (see, for
instance, Helpman et al., 2004).
The economy is endowed with an exogenous number of heterogeneous work-
ers L, who di⁄er in their abilities aj, j = 1;:::;L. Worker abilities are drawn
from a Pareto distribution Ga (a) = 1 ￿ (amin=a)k for a ￿ amin = 1 and indi-
viduals are assumed to know and maintain their ability levels at any point in
time.2
Besides ￿rms and workers, there is a government sector. On the expenditure
side, the government pays (worker-speci￿c) UB Bj. On the revenue side, the
government targets to harm mainly the winners of the international integration.
Since employed workers bene￿t in terms of their real wages and exporters bene￿t
in terms of their increasing market shares, the government implements two
sources of tax incomes: a proportional wage tax Tw paid by all employed workers
H and a proportional pro￿t tax T￿ paid by exporters Mx. Notably, we assume
1Notably, our interpretation of the parameter ￿ is slightly di⁄erent to that of Melitz (2003).
We prefer the term entrepreneurial (instead of ￿rm) productivity in order to distinguish be-
tween the quality of the management and originality of the business idea, and a ￿rm￿ s total
productivity, which also depends on the quality of its employed workers.
2Helpman et al. (2010a, b) introduced this concept in order to allow for worker hetero-
geneity. However, in their model, abilities are match-speci￿c and independently distributed.
Hence, a worker￿ s ability for a given match does not convey any information about his or her
ability for other (future) matches. The ability of an individual worker is unobservable, even
if the worker has an ￿employment history￿.
6that the tax base of the pro￿t tax, ￿ + ￿x, is the exporters￿total pro￿t, i.e.
the sum of domestic and export pro￿t. Furthermore, the average productivity
of ￿rms rises because of trade liberalization, implying that ￿rms on average
bene￿t. Thus, a proportional payroll tax Tpw paid by all ￿rms M is introduced
by the government. The corresponding proportional tax rates are tw 2 (0;1),
t￿ 2 (0;1) and tpw 2 (0;1).
Let us now turn to the ￿rms￿production technology. Consider a ￿rm i with
productivity ￿i. The production technology is given by:
qi = hi￿iai; (2)
where hi denotes the number of employees and ai represents the average ability
of employees. A ￿rm does not demand all abilities but sets a minimum quality
requirement. This minimum quality requirement is ￿rm-speci￿c, and it increases




i with ￿ ￿ 0: (3)
Eq. (3) represents a ￿rm￿ s technology constraint: ￿rm i does not employ workers
with abilities lower than a￿
i because its marginal product of labor is zero (or even
negative because of complementaries, see Helpman et al., 2010a, b). Parameter
￿ denotes the sensitivity of a￿
i with respect to entrepreneurial productivity.3
The wage o⁄er matters. Just as a ￿rm might not want to hire a low-ability
worker, a worker may not want to work for a low-wage ￿rm. Individuals di⁄er
with respect to their reservation wages. The higher the ability of an individual,
the higher is the marginal product of labor, and the higher is the reservation
wage. A worker does not apply for jobs paying less than the reservation wage.
As a result, we can identify an upper bound of abilities for each ￿rm. If
￿rm i o⁄ers a wage rate wi, there will be a worker who is indi⁄erent between
(short-term) unemployment and employment in ￿rm i. We de￿ne this worker as
employee zi with ability azi and reservation wage bzi. The indi⁄erence condition
is given by wnet
i = (1￿tw)wi = bzi. For the wage o⁄er wi, ￿rm i attracts workers
with abilities a ￿ azi, workers with a > azi do not apply for a job in ￿rm i.
Note that the upper bound of employees￿abilities rises with a higher net wage:
@azi=@wnet
i > 0.
The abilities of ￿rm i￿ s employees lie within the interval a￿
i and azi, where
the limits depend on productivity ￿i and wage rate wi. The average ability














where @ai=@azi > 0. A wage increase raises azi and thus average ability.
3The minimum quality requirement assumption can be motivated both from a empirical
and a from theoretical point of view. For a detailed discussion, see de Pinto and Michaelis
(2011).
7The determination of employment and wages at the sectoral level is mod-
elled as a ￿ve-stage game, which we solve by backward induction. In the ￿rst
stage, ￿rm i participates in the Melitz lottery and discovers its entrepreneurial
productivity ￿i. Given ￿i, ￿rm i decides whether to produce or not and ad-
ditionally whether to export or not. In the case of production, ￿rm i posts a
vacancy (stage two). The job description includes the minimum quality require-
ment a￿
i and a wage o⁄er wi, where we insinuate that ￿rms anticipate correctly
the outcome of the wage setting in stage four. Therefore, the o⁄ered wage will
be identical to the paid wage wi. Additionally, posting a vacancy is assumed to
be costless. More precisely, the advertisement does not create variable costs.
In the third stage, workers collect information about job vacancies. Informa-
tion gathering is costless, so that all workers have perfect knowledge of all job
descriptions. If the marginal costs of applications are zero, the optimal strategy
of a worker j with ability aj is to apply for all jobs with a minimum quality
requirement a￿
i ￿ aj and a (net) wage o⁄er no less than his or her reservation
wage. Any ￿rm i thus obtains a full distribution of abilities between the limits
a￿
i and azi. To extract an economic rent, the applicants form a monopoly trade
union at the ￿rm level. The membership of monopoly union i is denoted by ni.
Note that a worker will only apply for those vacancies s/he expects s/he will
accept. Consequently, a worker accepts the o⁄er of any job for which s/he has
applied (see Layard et al., 1991).
In the fourth stage, the monopoly union i sets the wage rate wi, where the
employment decision of the ￿rm in stage ￿ve is anticipated. After the ￿rm has
set the optimal employment level hi, it draws randomly workers from the union
members until hi is reached. Since all union members ful￿l the minimum quality
requirement and the union members accept the job o⁄er, there will be a ￿drawing
without repetition￿ . We abstract from a (costly) screening technology. Firms
are assumed to observe the minimum ability of a worker at no costs, but they are
not able to observe the exact value of aj of an individual worker. Furthermore,
note that the existence of unions eliminates any wage di⁄erentiation within
￿rms.
2.2 Labor demand
Our analysis at the sectoral level continues to focus at ￿rm i with the entre-
preneurial productivity ￿i. Firm i can either serve the domestic market only
or additionally export goods to the foreign market. We ￿rst look at ￿rm i￿ s
optimal behavior in the domestic market and take up the endogenous export
decision afterwards (see section 2.4).
We begin by discussing the derivation of the labor demand at stage ￿ve,
where wi, azi, a￿
i and ai are already determined. The net pro￿ts of ￿rm i are
de￿ned by
￿net
i ￿ (1 ￿ It￿)(ri ￿ (1 + tpw)hiwi ￿ f); (5)
where ri is real revenue. The indicator variable I in Eq. (5) is equal to one if
8￿rm i exports and becomes zero otherwise.4 Each ￿rm faces a constant elasticity
demand curve (1). Thus, the ￿rm￿ s revenue ri = qipi is given by
ri = q￿




where ￿ denotes the degree of competitiveness in the market for intermediate
goods. The ￿rm maximizes net pro￿ts ￿net
i by setting employment such that
the marginal revenue of labor equals marginal costs: @ri=@hi = (1 + tpw)wi.











If the wage rate increases, employment falls: @hi=@wi < 0. In our model, this
outcome is, however, not trivial. A wage hike swells the ￿rm-speci￿c interval
of abilities, ai and thus the marginal revenue rise (the labor demand curve
becomes steeper). Consequently, there are two e⁄ects operating in the opposite
direction in response to a wage increase: marginal costs and marginal revenues
shift up. The strength of the latter e⁄ect can be measured by the wage elasticity
of average abilities ￿ai;wi. As shown by de Pinto and Michaelis (2011) in detail,
￿ai;wi is equal across all ￿rms and (for reasonable parameter settings) smaller
than one. Then, the derivation of (7) with respect to wi proves that @hi=@wi < 0
holds for ￿ai;wi < 1. Increasing marginal revenue does not compensate the rising
marginal costs, but mitigates the employment reduction. Note that the number









is a constant mark-up 1=￿ over marginal costs. Note that pi is independent
of the pro￿t tax rate t￿. Every price setting that implies pro￿t maximization
before the pro￿t tax remains also optimal after the pro￿t tax as long as the
pro￿ts are still positive.
To complete our analysis in stage ￿ve, we specify the ￿rm￿ s net pro￿t ￿net
i
as a function of the ￿rms￿revenue and model parameters only. In doing so, we







Inserting (6￿ ) and hi = qi=(￿iai) [see (2)] into (5) yields:
￿net






4Because only exporters pay the pro￿t tax, we have ￿i = ￿net
i if ￿rm i serves the domestic
market only (I = 0).
92.3 Monopoly union and fallback income
In the fourth stage, the monopoly union i sets the wage rate wi, at which the
number of union members ni is already ￿xed. As shown above, union members
are heterogeneous with respect to their abilities, which lie within the interval
a￿
i and azi. The monopoly union maximizes the expected utility of the median











with bmi denoting the reservation wage (fallback income) of the median member.
Note that membership ni exceeds the ￿rm￿ s labor demand hi because of the
game structure at stage three (see below). Furthermore, the monopoly unions
are risk-neutral by assumption.
The monopoly union i ￿xes wi to maximize the Nash product NPi = EUmi￿
Umi subject to @ri=@hi = (1+tpw)wi with Umi = bmi being the union￿ s fallback
position. Owing to the constraint, the union anticipates that the ￿rm chooses
a point on its labor demand curve for any given wi.5 The solution of the
optimization problem leads to a well-known result: the wage wi is a mark-up








The union generates an economic surplus for its members, which we de￿ne as
the di⁄erence between the wage rate wi and the fallback income of the median
member bmi. The wage rate wi is increasing c.p. in the wage tax tw, re￿ ecting
the unions￿aim to stabilize the workers￿net wages.
We complete the analysis of stage four by the derivation of the fallback
income of worker j with ability aj. If worker j is the median member of ￿rm



















where (1￿t1)wj is worker j￿ s net outside wage, ￿ represents the discount factor
and ￿ denotes the probability of the ￿rm￿ s death (exogenous and independent of
productivity). Therefore, ￿ can also be interpreted as the probability of job loss
for any employee. The likelihood that worker j will switch from unemployment
to a job is captured by ej. The fallback income is de￿ned as the period income
5Recall that the labor demand curve becomes steeper if the wage rate increases because of
rising average abilities. Consequently, the monopoly union also anticipates the positive e⁄ect
of a higher wage rate, but as shown above, nevertheless employment decreases.
10of an unemployed worker: bj ￿ ￿V u
j (see Layard and Nickell, 1990). From the





In a steady state, the ￿ ow equilibrium for any quali￿cation level must hold.
The ￿ ow equilibrium for, e.g., the ability aj requires the in￿ ow from employment
to unemployment to be equal to the out￿ ow from unemployment to employment:
￿ (1 ￿ uj) = ejuj: (12)
Entrepreneurial productivity and workers￿abilities are both Pareto-distributed
with identical lower bounds and shape parameter k. These characteristics com-
bined with the assumption of random matching imply that the ratio of employed
workers with ability j, Hj; to the number of all workers with ability j, Lj; is
equal for all j. As a result, the unemployment rate is identical across all abilities:




Using (12) and (13), the fallback income can be derived as6
bj = uBj + (1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ tw)wj: (14)
As mentioned, the fallback income of worker j corresponds with the reservation
wage of worker j. The reservation wage is increasing in the UB, Bj, and in-
creasing in the outside wage wj, which is de￿ned as j￿ s expected wage rate in
the economy.
Let us have a closer look at the outside wage. The empirical literature
shows that wages are determined by both individual characteristics and a coun-
try￿ s macroeconomic performance (see, for instance, Fairris and Jonasson, 2008;
Nickell and Kong, 1992; Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991). We take up this
observation by assuming that the outside wage is a convex combination of a






0 ￿ ! ￿ 1: (15)
In our context, the most plausible microeconomic variable is the ability aj of
worker j. The higher the skill level of a worker, the higher is the wage s/he
can expect in the economy (or: the computer scientist expects a higher wage
than the collector irrespective of the state of the economy). Less obvious is
the macroeconomic variable. In a world with homogeneous workers, where, by
de￿nition, individual characteristics do not matter (! = 0), consistency requires
that the outside wage coincides with the wage prevailing in a (symmetric) gen-
eral equilibrium (see, for instance, Layard and Nickell, 1990). We pick up this
scenario by assuming that the outside wage of a worker j is increasing in the
6Note that (14) is an approximation, which holds for ￿u = 0. For a justi￿cation of this
simplifying assumption, see Layard and Nickell (1990).
11wage rate, which holds in the general equilibrium, w(e ￿t), where e ￿t denotes the
entrepreneurial productivity of the representative ￿rm (see below).7
The UB of worker j are modelled as a constant share of his net outside wage:
Bj = s(1 ￿ tw)wj; (16)
with 0 ￿ s ￿ 1 denoting the replacement ratio that is set by the government.
Eq. (16) ￿ts two important properties concerning the design of the UB. First, Bj
is worker-speci￿c. High-skilled workers (computer scientists) exhibit a higher
outside wage and thus receive a higher bene￿t relative to low-skilled workers
(collectors). Thus, the UB depends on the workers￿employment history. Second,
Bj is a positive function of the country￿ s macroeconomic performance, re￿ ecting
the connection between government￿expenditures and the business cycle (for a
similar modelling approach, see Haan/Prowse, 2010 and for empirical evidence,
see Fitzenberger/Wilke, 2010).
With these building blocks in place, noting j = mi, the fallback income (14)
and the bargained wage (11) can be rewritten as












respectively. As a result, wi is independent of the wage tax rate tw. On the
one hand, an increasing tw leads to a rise in the union￿ s wage claim [see (11)],
which leaves the worker￿ s net wage unchanged. On the other hand, the rising
tw implies a reduction in the UB and the net outside wage (1 ￿ t1)wj of the
same magnitude and consequently the fallback income declines [see (17)]. The
decrease in bmi countervails the increasing wage claim, leaving the wage rate
una⁄ected from variations of tw. Thus, a higher value of tw leads to a one-to-one
decrease in the net wage rate wnet
i = (1 ￿ tw)wi. Notably, this ￿nding strongly
depends on the assumption of using the net outside wage in the computation
of the UB [see (16)]. If instead Bj = swj is applied, the decline in fallback
income becomes smaller and thus it does not compensate the increasing wage
claim ￿wi would be a positive function of tw. However, simulations show that
a variation in the wage tax rate has an extremely low in￿ uence on wi. Thus, we
ignore this e⁄ect in the following by using (16) exclusively.8
Note that owing to heterogeneous individuals, the economic surplus (bar-
gained wage minus reservation wage) di⁄ers between union members. Within
7One might argue that high-skilled workers with a reservation wage above the wage paid
by the representative ￿rm are not a⁄ected by w(e ￿t). Consequently, w(e ￿t) should not be part
of their outside option. However, in a Melitz world with Pareto-distributed productivities the
aggregate variables have the property that they are identical to what they would be if the
economy were endowed with Mt identical ￿rms with productivity e ￿t. Therefore, w(e ￿t) is only
a shortcut for the "true" distribution of wages in the economy. A shift in w(e ￿t) should thus
be interpreted as proxy for a shift in the whole wage distribution, thus a⁄ecting all wages
irrespective of skill level.
8The corresponding simulation results are available upon request.
12the ￿rm￿ s and the union￿ s ability interval, the worker with the minimum quali-
￿cation obtains the largest rent (lowest reservation wage). The surplus declines
with members￿ability levels, because of an increasing reservation wage. Mem-
ber zi with the highest quali￿cation has a zero surplus, which makes him or her
indi⁄erent between taking a job in ￿rm i and looking for a job elsewhere.
2.4 Unions￿membership, vacancy posting and the Melitz
lottery
Stage three determines union membership ni. As illustrated above, all workers
with ability a￿
i ￿ a ￿ azi apply for a job at ￿rm i, so that each ￿rm i gets
the full distribution of abilities within the two limits. Workers with an ability
larger than azi have a reservation wage exceeding wi, they do not apply and
they are not members of monopoly union i. The number of applicants and thus









As shown by de Pinto and Michaelis (2011), the ability level of the median









In order to determine the ability limits we turn to the posting of the vacancy,
which is the topic of stage two, where a ￿rm￿ s entrepreneurial productivity ￿i




i . The upper limit, by contrast, is determined by
the requirement that the posted net wage equals the reservation wage of the
e¢ cient worker zi: (1 ￿ tw)wi = bzi. Inserting (18) and the reservation wage of
worker zi,





yields azi = ￿







i A ￿ 2￿
k=! ￿ 1: (21)
Note that a variation of tw does not in￿ uence azi. If e.g. tw declines, the
reservation wage and the net wage rate simultaneously decreases, leaving the
indi⁄erence condition of the e¢ cient worker una⁄ected.
If a ￿rm knows its entrepreneurial productivity ￿i, it sets a minimum ability
according to (3) and the ability of the e¢ cient worker is given by (21). Inserting
both into (20) and observing (18), we can rewrite the wage rate as:9
9Note that the wage wi is increasing in the entrepreneurial productivity ￿i. High-







In stage one, ￿rm i participates in the Melitz lottery and draws the entre-
preneurial productivity ￿i. Subsequently, the ￿rm has to decide whether to
enter the domestic market and to produce or not as well as whether to serve
the foreign market and to export or not. A ￿rm will produce for the domestic
market if and only if the drawn entrepreneurial productivity is at least as high
as the cut-o⁄ productivity level ￿
￿: ￿i ￿ ￿
￿. In this case, the expected stream
of pro￿ts is non-negative. The ￿rm with the lowest possible productivity ￿
￿ is
called the marginal ￿rm.
Concerning the export decision, there are variable iceberg costs ￿ > 1 besides
the already mentioned beachhead cost fx ￿ 0. Furthermore, exporting creates
a third cost component, i.e. the pro￿t tax on domestic pro￿ts t￿￿i [see (9)],
which would be zero if ￿rm i does not export due to our assumption that the
pro￿t tax incriminates only exporters. We can derive an export cut-o⁄ level ￿
￿
x
such that for ￿i ￿ ￿
￿
x the additional revenue of exporting is at least as high
as the additional costs.10 In line with Melitz (2003), only a fraction of ￿rms
engage in exporting.11 For ￿i ￿ ￿
￿
x, ￿rms are exporters and produce for both
the home and foreign markets (I = 1). For ￿
￿ ￿ ￿i < ￿
￿
x, ￿rms produce for the
home market only (I = 0).
If ￿rm i draws a productivity that exceeds the export cut-o⁄ level, ￿i ￿ ￿
￿
x,
the derivation of the corresponding export values is needed. The net export
pro￿t is de￿ned by ￿net
ix ￿ (1 ￿ t￿)(rix=￿ ￿ fx ￿ t￿￿i).12 Pro￿t maximization
yields pix = ￿pi, qix = ￿￿￿qi, hix = ￿1￿￿hi and rix = ￿1￿￿ri. Thus, the
export variables can be expressed as a function of the domestic variables (see
also Melitz, 2003). Using the simplifying assumption of f = fx (see Egger and
Kreickemeier, 2009a for a justi￿cation) and (9), we can reformulate the net
export pro￿t:
￿net





￿ (1 ￿ t￿)f
￿
: (23)
productivity ￿rms have to pay higher wages than do low-productivity ￿rms, since the ability
and thus the fallback income of the median member of the corresponding trade union is
higher. The empirical literature supports this result (see, for instance, Munch and Skaksen,
2008; Bayard and Troske, 1999).
10We provide the analytical evidence for this in section 3.2.
11This result is connected with the validity of the partitioning condition. We will come back
to this issue in section 3.1.
12Clearly, the inclusion of t￿￿i into the export pro￿t function is unconventional. We can
justify this approach with an economic and a formal argument. First, t￿￿i are costs connected
to the export decision. If ￿rms export, market shares increase; there are some gains of trade.
Only in this case, the government redistributes a fraction of trade gains by imposing the pro￿t
tax. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the costs of the pro￿t tax are paid from the additional
export pro￿ts. In the analogical way, ￿rms bear the payments of the (variable and ￿xed) trade
costs also from ￿ix. Second, we avoid a discontinuity in the export pro￿t function. If t￿￿i
disappears, ￿rms with a positive export pro￿t up to a certain threshold have no incentive to
export because of the pro￿t tax on domestic pro￿ts. Note again that the pro￿t tax base is the
exporter￿ s total pro￿t. Consequently, not only t￿￿i have to be considered for the net export
pro￿t de￿nition but also t￿￿ix.
14To complete our model at the sectoral level, one crucial step is left. The
existence of the marginal ￿rm with productivity ￿
￿ has important consequences
for the segregation of the labor force of the economy. Analogous to ￿rm i,
the marginal ￿rm also sets a minimum quality requirement a￿. Since no ￿rm
has a lower entrepreneurial productivity, a￿ can be interpreted as the minimum
quality requirement for the whole economy. For workers with a < a￿, their
abilities are not su¢ cient to gain any job, as no active ￿rm on the market will




Thus, we divide the labor force L into two groups: (i) active13 workers L
with a ￿ a￿ and u = 1 ￿ H=L < 1 and (ii) (long-term) unemployed persons Ll
with a < a￿ and ul = 1. The latter will never be members of a union because
they are not able to meet the job requirements. Consequently, the monopoly
union only accounts for active workers in the wage-setting process.
Long-term unemployed persons also receive UB. In contrast to the UB of
active workers, we eliminate the worker-speci￿c component. The reason is sim-
ple. Since a person with an ability below a￿ has no opportunity to get a job in
the economy, her/his outside wage drops to zero and according to (16) the UB
would be zero as well. To avoid this, we assume that the UB of long-term un-
employed persons is a constant share s of the net equilibrium wage rate instead
of the worker-speci￿c net outside wage. Formally, we get:
Bl




if j 2 (1;a￿]: (25)
Notably, Eq. (25) is a special case of the general formulation in (16), which
holds if the microeconomic variable in the outside wage disappears (! = 0).
3 General equilibrium
So far, we have described the model at the sectoral level. To gain insights into
the labor market and good market e⁄ects of the government￿ s behavior in the
presence of monopoly unions and an open economy setting, we now derive the
general equilibrium.
3.1 Average productivity and aggregation
Consider the weighted average productivity level of all active ￿rms in a country
e ￿t ￿rst. By following the step-by-step derivation of Egger and Kreickemeier
(2009a), we get:















13￿Active￿ means that these workers have a positive employment probability. Nevertheless,
at each point in time a fraction of ￿active￿workers is unemployed.
15with ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿!) > 0. ￿ denotes the ex ante probability of being
an exporter:
￿ =
1 ￿ G￿ (￿
￿
x)










; 0 < ￿ < 1: (27)
e ￿ is the average productivity of all domestic ￿rms and e ￿x is the average produc-
tivity of exporting ￿rms. Owing to the Pareto distribution, these productivities
are given by:












with k > ￿:
The inspection of (27), (28) and (29) indicates that the total average pro-
ductivity e ￿t depends on the relation between the export cut-o⁄level ￿
￿
x and the
cut-o⁄ productivity level ￿
￿. To calculate ￿
￿
x=￿
￿ (and hence e ￿x=e ￿), we use the
well-known zero cut-o⁄pro￿t condition (henceforth ZPC) (see Melitz, 2003). By
de￿nition, the marginal ￿rm ￿
￿ gains a zero net pro￿t: ￿net(￿
￿) = ￿(￿
￿) = 0.14
From (9) and ￿i = ￿
￿, we obtain:
r(￿
￿) = ￿f: (30)
Analogically, we de￿ne ￿net
x (￿
￿
x) = 0, where a ￿rm just breaks even in the
export market. This condition holds if and only if the exporting revenue covers
the extra trading costs. Using (23) yields:
r(￿
￿




with ￿1￿￿ ￿ t￿ by assumption.15






￿)￿, which follows from














Next, we combine (27) with (32) to get
￿ = ￿￿k=￿: (28￿ )
14Notably, (27) implies ￿￿ < ￿￿
x. Thus, the marginal ￿rm only produces for the domestic
market, concluding I = 0 and ￿net(￿￿) = ￿(￿￿).
15Note that if all ￿rms pay the pro￿t tax, the export decision is independent of t￿ and we
obtain r (￿￿
x) = ￿f￿￿￿1.
16Substituting (32) into (26) and using (28￿ ), we ￿nally obtain:






The di⁄erence between the two averages e ￿t and e ￿ can be explained by the
interplay between the lost-in-transit e⁄ect (henceforth LT), i.e. goods vanish en
route because of iceberg transport costs and the export-selection e⁄ect (hence-
forth ES), i.e. exporting ￿rms are the most productive in the economy. The LT
and ES are measured by ￿￿￿1 and (￿
￿
x=￿
￿)￿, respectively. The former shrinks
total average productivity, the latter increases the total average productivity,
both in comparison to the domestic level e ￿. Clearly, the LT always occurs if




there is no ES and e ￿t decreases relative to e ￿. In the Melitz world, it is typically




most productive ￿rms serve the foreign market and thus the ES is strictly posi-
tive. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009a) show additionally that if the partitioning
condition is ful￿lled and no pro￿t tax is implemented (t￿ = 0), the LT and ES
always exactly o⁄set each other ((￿
￿
x=￿
￿)￿ = ￿￿￿1), which implies e ￿t = e ￿.
In our framework, with f = fx and t￿ > 0, the partitioning condition ￿ > 1
is ful￿lled and the ES is thus positive. The inspection of (32) shows however
that c.p. the export productivity cut-o⁄increases in t￿, meaning that exporters
are even more productive than in the case of t￿ = 0. The additional export
selection raises the ES above the level that is necessary to countervail the LT,
which implies an increase in total average productivity e ￿t. This mechanism is
represented by the parameter D in Eq. (33). As a result, we obtain e ￿t > e ￿ if
t￿ > 0 (D > 1) and e ￿t = e ￿ if t￿ = 0 (D = 1).
The aggregate variables are derived in the standard way with the underlying
assumption of an equalized balance of payments. It follows: P = p(e ￿t) ￿ 1,
Y = Mtq(e ￿t) and R = Mtr(e ￿t). The aggregate gross pro￿t is calculated for
the hypothetical case that the pro￿t tax is withhold by exporters. We obtain
the standard formulation ￿ = Mt￿(e ￿t) (see Melitz, 2003). For the employment
level, we get:
H = Mh(e ￿t) ￿ ￿
￿!=￿
1 ￿2 1, (34)
￿2 ￿
k ￿ ￿
k ￿ ￿ + ￿!





Recall that Mx represents the number of exporters and M denotes the number
of ￿rms located in each country. The total number of all active ￿rms (and thus
the number of all available varieties) in a country is given by Mt = M + Mx =
M(1 + ￿).
The aggregate variables have an important property (see Melitz, 2003): the
aggregate levels of P, Y , R, ￿ and H are identical to what they would be
if the economy were endowed with Mt identical ￿rms with productivity e ￿t.
17Therefore, we treat the ￿rm with productivity e ￿t as the representative ￿rm of
the economy. Note that the equations for P, Y , R, ￿ and H are aggregation
rules. To determine their levels in the equilibrium, we have to add the ￿rm
entry and exit condition and the labor market clearing condition.
Turning to the government sector, we calculate the aggregate levels of the
UB, the wage tax, the payroll tax and the pro￿t tax (see Appendix A for the
analytical evidence):
B = Bl + Bu = s(1 ￿ tw)
h




Tw = tw￿Y; (36)
Tpw = tpw￿Y; (37)
T￿ = t￿Mx
￿
￿(e ￿x) + ￿x(e ￿x)
￿
; (38)
where ￿3 being a constant de￿ned in Appendix A. With (38) at hand, the
aggregate net pro￿t is given by:
￿net = Mt￿(e ￿t) ￿ t￿Mx
￿
￿(e ￿x) + ￿x(e ￿x)
￿
: (39)
To complete the aggregation, we compute the total unemployment rate u. As
mentioned above, we distinguish between the unemployment rate of low-skilled
workers ul and the unemployment rate of active workers u. The aggregate
(total) unemployment rate u is a weighted average of ul and u. Using the
probabilities P(a < a￿) = 1 ￿ (a￿)
￿k and P(a > a￿) = (a￿)
￿k as weights, we







that u = 1 ￿ H=L, the aggregate unemployment rate simpli￿es to




The higher the minimum quality requirement, the higher is the share of un-
employed low-skilled workers and the higher is the aggregate unemployment
rate.
3.2 Firm entry and exit
We now turn to the analysis of ￿rm entries and exits, which ends up in the
determination of the cut-o⁄ productivity ￿
￿. In line with Melitz (2003), two
conditions must hold in the case of production: the free-entry condition (hence-
forth FE) and ZPC.
We have already introduced the ZPC and obtained (30). In a next step, we
derive the average net pro￿t per ￿rm ￿net
t ￿ ￿net=M that exists in the economy
18if the marginal ￿rm gains zero pro￿t. Using (39), Mt = M(1+￿) and Mx = ￿M
yields:
￿net
t = (1 + ￿)￿(e ￿t) ￿ t￿￿(￿(e ￿x) + ￿x(e ￿x)): (41)
Reformulating (9) and (23) for gross domestic and export pro￿ts, respectively,
substituting r(e ￿t) = (e ￿t=￿
￿)￿r(￿
￿) as well as r(e ￿x) = (e ￿x=￿
￿)￿r(￿
￿) and ob-
serving (30) as well as (27) leads to ￿(e ￿t) = (D￿￿1￿1)f, ￿(e ￿x) = (￿￿￿=k￿1￿1)f
and ￿x(e ￿x) = (￿1￿￿￿￿￿=k￿1 ￿ 1)f. Inserting these expressions into (41), we ￿-
nally obtain the average net pro￿t in the presence of the ZPC:
￿net






(1 + ￿1￿￿)￿￿￿=k￿1 ￿ 2
￿
f: (42)
As a result, the average net pro￿t ￿net
t in the economy is independent of ￿
￿,
which is a direct consequence of the Pareto distribution properties. Obviously,
the aggregate net pro￿t ￿net = M￿net
t ￿an equivalent formulation of (39) ￿
additionally depends on the number of ￿rms operating in the market, which is
derived in section 3.3.
The FE ensures that all existing ￿rms have an incentive to participate in the
Melitz lottery. Formally, this requires fe = (1 ￿ G￿(￿
￿))￿net
t =￿, with 1￿G￿(￿
￿)
denoting the probability of a successful draw. Hence, in the equilibrium, the
sunk cost component is equal to the expected discounted average net pro￿ts.






















￿, e ￿ and e ￿t depend on the pro￿t tax rate t￿. The formulation in (44)
￿ts two special cases that can be found in the literature. First, if there is
no pro￿t tax, we have t￿ = 0 and D = 1, the cuto⁄-productivity drops to
￿
￿
1 = [(1 + ￿)(￿1 ￿ 1)f=￿fe]
1=k (see Egger/Kreickemeier, 2009a for the same
result). Second, if all ￿rms have to pay the pro￿t tax (not only exporters),
￿ = ￿￿(￿￿1)k=￿, D = 1 and e ￿t = e ￿ holds because of the export cut-o⁄ is then
independent of t￿. Immediately, (41) changes to ￿net
t = (1+￿)￿(e ￿t)￿t￿(￿(e ￿)+
￿￿x(e ￿x)). It can be easily shown that ￿(e ￿) + ￿￿x(e ￿x) is equal to (1 + ￿)￿(e ￿t),
which implies ￿
￿
2 = [(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ t￿)(￿1 ￿ 1)f=￿fe]
1=k (see Egger/Kreickemeier,
2009b for the same result).
16Notably, the FE-condition implies that ￿net is only used to ￿nance the initial investment
costs (measured in units of the ￿nal good Y ): Ye = feMe, where Me denotes the mass of
￿rms participating in the Melitz lottery. In a stationary equilibrium, ￿rms that are hit by
the exogenous death shock have to be replaced by market entering ￿rms ￿those who pass the
Melitz lottery successfully: ￿M = (1 ￿ G￿(￿￿))Me = (￿￿)￿k Me. Using (43) leads to Me =
M￿net
t =fe. Thus, the costs for the initial investments can be rewritten as Ye = M￿net
t = ￿net,
which proofs that aggregate net pro￿ts ￿nance Ye.
19One further remark. An increase in ￿
￿ induces the FS ￿e.g. the least pro-
ductive ￿rms are driven out of the market and average productivity rises ￿as
explained in detail by Melitz (2003). However, variations of ￿
￿ have an addi-
tional consequence in our setting. If, e.g., ￿
￿ increases, the ability cut-o⁄ goes
up as well [see (24)], implying that the labor demand for workers with abilities
below (the raised) a￿ decrease to zero ￿workers with a < a￿ do not ful￿ll any
job requirement in the economy. Consequently, they are driven out of the labor
market and switch to long-term unemployment. We call this channel worker
selection e⁄ect in the following (see de Pinto/Michaelis, 2011 for a detailed
discussion).
3.3 Equilibrium (long-term) unemployment and welfare
In order to pin down the aggregate unemployment rate in the general equilib-
rium, we make use of the well-known concepts of wage-setting and price-setting
schedules (see Layard et al., 1991). Consider ￿rst aggregate price-setting behav-





￿a(e ￿t(t￿)) ￿ e ￿t(t￿): (45)
The FRW is independent of (un)employment, which is no surprise because of
our assumptions about technology (output is linear to labor) and the constant
price elasticity of product demand. As a speci￿cation of our model, the FRW
depends positively on the average ability level. Inserting the minimum quality










An increase in the payroll tax rate leads to a rise in ￿rms￿ marginal costs,
which implies a reduction in the FRW: @wPS=@tpw < 0. On the contrary, the
implications of the pro￿t tax rate t￿ are ambiguous as shown in more detail
below.
Let us turn to the target real wage. The (representative) monopoly union
￿xes the wage rate; we obtain (22). Taking the macroeconomic variables as
given, the target real wage of the (representative) monopoly union can be written
as




(1 ￿ u(1 ￿ s)) ￿ e ￿t(t￿)￿!: (47)
In the general equilibrium, we have wPS(e ￿t) = wWS(e ￿t) = w(e ￿t). With
this condition, we can calculate the number of long-term unemployed Ll, the
number of active workers L, the number of employed active workers H, the
aggregate unemployment rate u, the measure of welfare Y=L and the number of
20￿rms M for any given parameter setting of the government (see Appendix B).































u = 1 ￿
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￿

















































Inserting (50), (53) and (52) into (34) leads to the equilibrium number of em-
ployed workers by the representative ￿rm, h(e ￿t). Owing to (2), we can then
determine q(e ￿t), which completes our analysis at this stage.18
17The stability of the general equilibrium turns out to be critical in one way. Theoretically,
the marginal ￿rm has an incentive to deviate from the (monopoly union) wage setting in order
to increase its pro￿t. As explored in detail by de Pinto and Michaelis (2011), however, we can
avert this behavior by assuming a further labor market friction, i.e. e¢ ciency wages. Clearly,
extending the model in that way has a value added. But balancing this value added with the
loss of analytical tractability we decided to postpone this issue to further research and refrain
from giving marginal ￿rms additional latitude.
18Note that the general equilibrium is still incomplete due to the absence of the government￿ s
budget constraint. We close the gap in section ￿ve, but prior this, we investigate the policy
instruments￿partial e⁄ects.
214 The government￿ s policy instruments: partial
analysis
Given the derived general equilibrium, we now investigate the impact of the
government￿ s policy instruments on the model￿ s outcomes in more detail. We
begin with a partial analysis, i.e. discussing the e⁄ects of introducing UB and
its three kinds of funding separately.19 We regard just one of the government￿ s
political parameters at a time, setting the others equal to zero.20 To be more
precise, we subsequently analyze the in￿ uence of the government￿ s decisions on
the distribution of ￿rms operating in the market (namely the FS), on the labor
and the goods market outcomes as well as on welfare.
4.1 Unemployment bene￿ts
Consider ￿rst the introduction of UB with the replacement ratio s (ds = s
and tw = tpw = t￿ = 0) as the political variable. As shown by (42) and
(43), the ZPC and FE are both una⁄ected, leaving cut-o⁄ productivity ￿
￿ and
total average productivity e ￿t unchanged. Thus, the FS is independent of the
replacement ratio s, the distribution of active ￿rms remains constant. Since the
replacement ratio has no e⁄ect on ￿
￿, the ability cut-o⁄ a￿ remains constant as
well, implying that the segregation of the labor force and thus the number of
long-term unemployed persons Ll do not vary with s [see (48)].
But the employment of active workers is a⁄ected. Let us label a situation
without the government by an apostrophe, then from (50) we get H=H0 < 1.21
The UB raises the fallback income of the union￿ s median member, which implies
an increase in the union￿ s target real wage at any given level of employment [see
(47)]. The ￿rm￿ s answer to such a rise in its marginal costs is an increase in
its pro￿t-maximizing price. Product and labor demand drop, and the number
of employed active workers H decreases. Owing to the constant Ll, the de-
crease in the labor demand of active workers causes an increase in the aggregate
unemployment rate u=u0 > 1 [see (51)].
The decline in H leads to a reduction in the overall ￿rm￿ s production; the




19This scenario is clearly unrealistic since in almost all countries UB and the corresponding
taxes already exist. To hold our analysis tractable at this stage, we use ds = s as a shortcut
for ds > 0 and also follow this rule for the revenue side. With a similar justi￿cation, the
comparison between a closed and an open economy can be found in the literature as a shortcut
for trade liberalization.
20Analytically, it is also possible that the remaining policy instruments are constant, but
di⁄erent from zero. Since this proceeding does not create new insights or e⁄ects, but only
complicates the equations, we abstain from it.
21For concreteness, the apostrophe indicates the case of s = tw = twp = t￿ = 0. The
model￿ s outcome is then identically to the results provided by de Pinto and Michaelis (2011)
in case of monopoly unions.
224.2 The wage tax
Turning to the impact of introducing the wage tax with dtw = tw and s = tpw =
t￿ = 0, we ￿nd no e⁄ect on the goods and labor market outcomes at all. This
neutrality is based on three mechanism.
First, the target real wage does not vary with the wage tax rate. Under
consideration of (11), the (representative) monopoly union enhances the wage
claim for any given level of the fallback income, wws(e ￿t) rises. However, as
mentioned above, the fallback income declines in tw, which counteracts the
increase in wws(e ￿t). In the equilibrium, both e⁄ects exactly o⁄set each other
and the target real wage remains constant [see (47)].
Second, a(e ￿t) is una⁄ected. On the one hand, the net wage o⁄er (1 ￿
tw)wws(e ￿t) decreases, which c.p. reduces the ￿rm-speci￿c interval of abilities.
On the other hand, the fallback income (or reservation wage) declines, which c.p.
expands the ￿rm-speci￿c interval of abilities. With the indi⁄erence condition
(1￿tw)wws(e ￿t) = b(e ￿t) it is evident that both e⁄ects exactly o⁄set each other,
there is no variation in the ￿rms-speci￿c interval of abilities and thus in a(e ￿t).
Third, ￿
￿ and e ￿t are independent of tw. As a consequence, a￿ and thus Ll
do not vary. Together with channel two, this implies that the FRW remains
constant. With target real wage, FRW and e ￿t being independent of tw, goods
and labor market outcomes are una⁄ected and the wage tax is completely neutral
for the economy. Looking at the literature, the neutrality result is empirically
well-founded (see for instance Layard et al., 1991 and Pissarides, 1998).
4.3 The payroll tax
Next, we consider the introduction of the payroll tax with dtpw = tpw and
s = tw = t￿ = 0. Concerning the employment of active workers ￿rst, dtpw = tpw
raises the marginal costs of the representative ￿rm. The optimal response is
clearly an increase in prices, which leads to a decrease in the FRW, wPS=w0
PS <
1 [see (45)]. The rise in prices dampens the demand for each variety, and thus






= (1 + tpw)
￿! < 1:
The employment reduction leads to a one-to-one decrease in aggregate output







= (1 + tpw)
￿! < 1:
Like the former policy instruments, the FS remains constant. Thus, ￿
￿
and e ￿t are una⁄ected just as a￿ and the number of long-term unemployed per-
sons. The economic intuition behind this result is as follows. On the one hand,
the number of active ￿rms in the market declines, M=M0 < 1 [see (53) and
Y=Y 0 < 1]. The demand reduction mentioned above yield a decrease in the
23￿rms￿net pro￿ts implying that the least productive ￿rms are driven out of the
market. On the other hand, the decreasing number of ￿rms raises the demand
for each variety, revenues and pro￿ts of the still active ￿rms increase. Given
this outcome, a ￿rm that observes ￿
￿ in the Melitz lottery can still obtain a
zero-pro￿t and thus stay at the market.22
Note that these ￿ndings also hold if the government would introduce a tax
on ￿rms￿revenues. Due to the mark-up pricing rule, the optimal response of
such an increase in marginal costs is a rise in prices. The FRW falls, and thus
employment as well as the welfare unambiguously decreases.
4.4 The pro￿t tax
In contrast to previous ￿ndings, the introduction of the pro￿t tax, dt￿ = t￿
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The pro￿t tax operates through three channels. First, dt￿ = t￿ c.p. reduces
average net pro￿ts in the economy directly. Second, Eq. (28￿ ) shows that the
probability of being an exporter declines. Thus, (1+￿)=(1+￿0) < 1 holds, which
also reduces ￿net
t . Third, as explained above, the ES exceeds the LT if t￿ > 0,
which is measured by D > 1. Consequently, average productivity increases at
any given level of ￿
￿: e ￿t=e ￿
0
t = D > 1 [see (33)], inducing ￿(e ￿t)=￿0(e ￿
0
t) > 1.
Hence, the average net pro￿t per ￿rm increases. As a result, channels one and
two reduce ￿net
t ; channel three, however, increases ￿net
t . The pro￿t tax e⁄ect
on the ZPC and hence on ￿net
t is ambiguous.23
Owing to Pareto-distributed entrepreneurial productivities, the ZPC uniquely
determines ￿net
t . For simplicity, let us assume that ￿net
t decreases in response
to the introduction of t￿, i.e. channels one and two dominate channel three.
The consequences for the economy are straightforward. Since ￿net
t declines, the
present value of average net pro￿ts (1 ￿ G(￿
￿))￿net
t =￿ decreases for any given
level of ￿
￿. Hence, the entry into the Melitz lottery is less attractive, which c.p.
reduces the mass of ￿rms passing through the lottery successfully. Thus, the
number of available goods in the market, Mt, shrinks, implying c.p. a demand
increase for each variety [see (1)]. Consequently, the revenues of all ￿rms shift
up whereby less productive ￿rms than before the pro￿t tax can cover their ￿xed
22Recall that in every period, a fraction of ￿rms are hit by an exogenous death shock ￿ and
leave the market immediately. To ensure the stability of the general equilibrium, those ￿rms
have to be replaced with the same number of ￿rms entering the market: ￿M = (1￿G(￿￿))Me.
Thus, at any point of time, there are ￿rms that participate in the Melitz lottery and potentially
observe ￿￿ as its productivity.
23In the case that all ￿rms must pay the pro￿t tax (not only exporters), the probability of
being an exporter, ￿, and the export cut-o⁄ (D = 1) remain unchanged. Thus, the pro￿t tax
unambiguously decreases ￿net
t (see Egger/Kreickemeier, 2009b for a similar result).
24costs and enter the market.24 Analytically, ￿
￿ decreases, which in turn dimin-
ishes the FS, implying a decrease in the average productivity of all domestic
￿rms e ￿ [see (28)]. Notably, the inverse conclusion holds if ￿net
t increases.
Let us turn to the in￿ uences on the labor and goods market. Based on
our ￿ndings, the variation in ￿net
t and thus the sign of the FS is ambiguous.
The distribution of active ￿rms may shift up or down with the corresponding
consequences for e ￿ [see (28)] and c.p. for e ￿t [see (33)]. The latter, however, is
additionally a⁄ected by the ES. The pro￿t tax unambiguously enhances export
selection which leads to a rise in total average productivity e ￿t for any given level
of ￿
￿. In order to separate both elements, we divide e ￿t according to (33) into
the FS element e ￿ and the ES element D. Thus, we can distinguish two cases:
(i) negative FS (￿
￿=￿
￿0 < 1 and e ￿=e ￿
0
< 1) and positive ES (D > 1)






















The decrease in the cut-o⁄ productivity leads to a fall in workers￿minimum
quality requirements, and thus the number of long-term unemployed persons
shrinks: the worker selection e⁄ect becomes weaker. Concerning the number of









Weaker worker selection increases employment H. But there are two additional
e⁄ects. First, the lower FS and thus the decrease in e ￿ enhance the marginal
costs of the representative ￿rm, shifting down the FRW and labor demand.
The employment of active workers decreases.25 Second, the ES implies a rise
in average productivity, reducing marginal costs, which contradicts the FRW
e⁄ect. For 0 < ! < ￿k, the ES and the worker selection e⁄ect dominate the
FRW e⁄ect; labor demand increases. For ! > ￿k, the decrease in the FRW
compensates the weaker worker selection, but the extra labor demand because
24In a more technical reasoning, the decline in (1 ￿ G(￿￿))￿net
t =￿ injured the FE and thus
the existence of a stationary equilibrium (see Melitz, 2003). Therefore, the cut-o⁄ productivity
￿￿ decreases, raising the probability of getting a favorable draw 1￿G(￿￿) and thus increasing
the present value of ￿net
t until the FE holds again [see (43)].
25This e⁄ect is mitigated by a decrease in the target real wage. According to (3), the
representative ￿rm decreases its minimum quality requirement, while the union focuses on a
median member with lower abilities than before and bargains for a lower wage. The reduction
in the target real wage will be reinforced by the impairment in macroeconomic performance.
The outside wage of the median member decreases [see (15)], and because of a lower fallback
income the union reduces its wage claim. Consequently, the labor demand increases. However,
for ! > 0, the net e⁄ect is always negative: the decreasing labor demand due to the FRW
e⁄ect dominates the increasing labor demand due to the union￿ s lower wage claim.
25of the ES may countervail this. Hence, the overall employment e⁄ect depends
on the parameter setting. In the same way, the aggregate unemployment rate u
decreases for 0 < ! < ￿k, but its variation is ambiguous for ! > ￿k [see (40)].










The sign of the net e⁄ect is again parameter-dependent. We ￿nd ￿ve channels
that partially work in opposite directions. First, the lower worker selection im-
plies c.p. a higher employment level and increases therefore output and welfare.
Second, the decrease in the FRW reduces output and welfare with the factor
!. Third, owing to the technology assumption (2), the weaker FS (lower e ￿)
directly reduces output one-to-one. Fourth, the decrease in e ￿ causes a fall in
average abilities of the active workers [see (46)]. This reduces output by the
factor ￿. Finally, the ES raises the average productivity and thus works in the
opposite direction to channels two, three and four; output and welfare conse-
quently increase because of the ES.26 The implications are straightforward. For
! + 1 + ￿ < ￿k, the positive worker selection e⁄ect dominates the negative
e⁄ects of reducing e ￿; the ES enforces this outcome. Output and welfare unam-
biguously rise. For ! + 1 + ￿ > ￿k, however, output and welfare decline due
to the interplay between channels one to four. However, the positive acting ES
may countervail this. As a result, the output and welfare e⁄ect is in this case
ambiguous.
(ii) positive FS (￿
￿=￿
￿0 > 1 and e ￿=e ￿
0
> 1) and positive ES (D > 1)
If the cut-o⁄ productivity increases, the number of long-term unemployed
persons shifts up. Employment, output and welfare decrease. However, the
sharper FS (higher e ￿) generates the opposite outcome: the FRW increases, la-
bor demand, and output as well as welfare rise. Additionally, the ES implies a
further increase in total average productivity, thereby reducing ￿rms￿marginal
costs, which also has a positive impact on employment and welfare as described
in more detail above. Thus, the total e⁄ects on employment and welfare are
parameter-dependet. For ! > ￿k, the employment e⁄ect is strictly positive.
For ! < ￿k employment declines because of the dominance of the worker se-
lection e⁄ect, but increases due to the positive acting ES; the net e⁄ect is thus
ambiguous. Similarly, welfare increases for ! + 1 + ￿ > ￿k but its variation is
ambiguous for ! + 1 + ￿ < ￿k.
26Notably, also  2 depends on the pro￿t tax rate and hence we also have to look at  2= 0
2 in
order to complete the partial welfare e⁄ect. Howover, simulations, which are available upon
request the author, show that  2= 0
2 ￿ 1 holds for any value of t￿. Thus, we ignore this
channel in the following.
265 The redistribution schemes: total analysis
5.1 The government￿ s budget constraint
So far, we have treated the government￿ s values s; tw, tpw and t￿ as exoge-
nously given. In a general equilibrium, however, the government has to keep to
its budget constraint. To calculate this budget constraint, we assume the fol-
lowing procedure. At the starting position, the economy stands in the general
equilibrium after trade liberalization, i.e. lowering ￿ (see below), and without
government interference (s = tw = tpw = t￿ = 0). Next, the government intro-
duces UB by setting the replacement ratio s and chooses one of the three types of
taxes.27 The budget constraint then endogenously determines the correspond-
ing tax rates, which lead to an equalized balance. Clearly, the government￿ s
policy instruments are not revenue-neutral but they have repercussion e⁄ects
on the budget. To avoid further complications from this channel, we follow
Creedy and McDonald (1992) as well as Goerke (1996) in assuming that the
budget is ex ante revenue-neutral, i.e. the budget does not vary in response to
the government￿ s policy.28
Formally, the budget constraint is always computed for the general equilib-
rium at the starting position and we thus indicate the respectively variables with
an apostrophe in the following.29 Using (35), (36), (37) and (38), we distinguish
three possible RS with three separate budget constraints.










= tw￿Y 0: (54)










= tpw￿Y 0: (55)






















Now, we analyze the impact of the government￿ s decisions under consideration
of these budget constraints. Analytically, we solve the budget constraints re-
spectively for tw, tpw, as well as t￿, and insert the results into the outcome of
the general equilibrium. For the three market interventions, we obtain a sys-
tem of equations that only depends on the replacement ratio s and on model
27Note that we abstain from mixing the three sources of income in order to consider the
diverging e⁄ects of the di⁄erential taxes separately.
28For a general equilibrium model with ex post revenue-neutrality, i.e. the budget is neutral
after the consideration of all possible adjustments in the economy, see Michaelis and P￿￿ger
(2000).
29Recall that the apostrophe denotes the s = tw = tpw = t￿ = 0 case.
27Parameter Value Interpretation Source





































parameters. Hence, the government￿ s choice of the replacement ratio￿ s size and
their funding pins down the labor and goods market values.
Although we are able to provide a closed form solution in this way, the
government￿ s in￿ uences are potentially ambiguous. Our ￿ndings in the partial
analysis already indicate that the net e⁄ect of the taxation system is undeter-
mined in most cases. Under the consideration of both, namely the replacement
ratio s and the ￿nancial form, this tendency is even more likely. In order to
obtain explicit results, we thus simulate our model. The following numerical
illustration is based on standard practice in the literature. Table 1 summarizes
the parameter values for monthly time periods.
We follow Ghironi and Melitz (2005) as well as Felbermayr et al. (2011)
to calibrate most of the Melitz model elements, but we make one substantial
variation. As stated by Eaton et al. (2004), we set the shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution to be equal to 4:2, which is relatively higher in comparison
to its standard calibration value of 3:4. This variation can be justi￿ed by the
nature of the general equilibrium without government￿activities. Observing (50)
and u0 = 1 ￿ H0=L0 shows that ￿3 ￿ e ￿
0!
￿ 1 must hold to ensure 0 ￿ u0 ￿ 1.30
Put di⁄erently, the aggregate labor demand H0 must not exceed the number of
active workers L0 in the equilibrium. This condition is c.p. ful￿lled if the shape
parameter k is su¢ ciently high. The reason for this is simple. The higher k, the
larger is the fraction of ￿rms with an entrepreneurial productivity close to the
cut-o⁄ level, the larger is the fraction of ￿rms with a relatively low minimum
quality requirement, and the larger is the number of active workers. Thus, our
slightly di⁄erent calibration with k = 4:2 is needed to guarantee the existence of
30For a similar problem, see Egger and Kreickemeier (2009a).
28Figure 1: Trade liberalization
an equilibrium at the starting position, without o⁄ending against the empirical
￿ndings.
Two other parameters are speci￿c to our approach, namely ! and ￿. The
parameter !, measuring the weight of the abilities in the wage determination,
has been estimated only in a few studies. Keane (1993) claims that 84 percent
of wage di⁄erences across industries are explained by individual ￿xed e⁄ects,
while only 16 percent can be traced back to industry dummies. The strong
weight of individual characteristics in the wage determination is con￿rmed by,
for instance, Fairris and Jonasson (2008) and Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991).
Hence, a value of ! = 0:8 does not seem at odds with the empirical literature.
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical estimation
for the parameter ￿, which captures the strength of the minimum quality re-
quirements. Intuitively, ￿ should be smaller than 1. We set ￿ = 0:25, implying
that the minimum quality requirement is relatively weak. Thus, the quality of
the ￿rm￿ s management, ￿, is signi￿cant higher than is the ability level of its
least e¢ cient worker, ￿
￿. In our opinion, this should be the case in nearly all
￿rms; nevertheless, an empirical estimation of ￿ is a task for future research.
Additionally, we normalize the price index and total labor force to one without
any loss of generality.
5.3 Simulation results
5.3.1 Trade liberalization
Before we start our discussion of the di⁄erent market interventions, let us ￿rst
explain the need for government interference in more detail by evaluating the
impact of trade liberalization on s = tw = tpw = t￿ = 0. In line with Melitz
(2003), we model trade liberalization as a reduction in the iceberg cost ￿. To
be more precise, we compare the model￿ s outcomes before trade liberalization
(￿0 = 1:6, point A) and after trade liberalization (￿1 = 1:3, point B). Figure 1
illustrates the results.
As is standard in the literature, trade liberalization increases the FS, and
thus the cut-o⁄productivity shifts up. This in turn reduces potential low-skilled
job vacancies, the worker selection e⁄ect becomes sharper and the number of
29long-term unemployed persons enhances. On the contrary, the intensi￿ed FS
leads to an increase in the FRW, which raises labor demand. However, the
increasing worker selection e⁄ect dominates the FRW e⁄ect; thus, employment
shrinks and the unemployment rate rises. Furthermore, the FS dominates em-
ployment reduction and welfare hence increases. Therefore, the country bene￿ts
from trade liberalization on the macroeconomic level because of this welfare hike.
The gains of trade are though unequal distributed. On the one hand, ￿rms ￿
especially exporters ￿and still employed persons gain from trade, whereas on
the other, low-skilled workers ￿by now long-term unemployed persons ￿and
workers losing their employment are harmed by trade liberalization (for a more
detailed discussion, see de Pinto/Michaelis, 2011 and Melitz, 2003).
At this point, the government implements the RS. Clearly, all three bene￿t
the losers by paying UB. However, the impact on the trade gains at the macro-
economic level is critical. We know from our partial analysis that UB reduce
welfare and destroy the gains of trade but we also have to take into account the
implications of the UB￿funding. Therefore, we investigate whether the several
RS amplify or mitigate the destruction of trade gains in order to create a rank-
ing which measures the policy success. Note that in ￿gure 1, the trade gains
are equal to the di⁄erence between point B (situation after trade liberalization)
and point A (situation before trade liberalization) in the welfare plot.
5.3.2 RS 1: UB and the wage tax
From our partial analysis, we know that neither UB nor the wage tax in￿ uences
the FS, leaving the distribution of ￿rms and the number of long-term unem-
ployed persons unchanged. Concerning the labor and goods market outcome,
Figure 2 illustrates our simulation results.31
We have shown in our partial analysis that the wage tax is neutral for the
labor and goods market outcomes at the aggregate level. Thus, the partial
e⁄ect of the UB translates one-to-one in the total e⁄ect of RS 1. The target real
wage increases, but since the FRW remains constant, ￿rms reduce their labor
demand. Employment decreases respectively the unemployment rate increases.
Concerning welfare, the derived employment reduction decreases output per
capita.
Let us discuss the distributional implications of the RS 1 from a microeco-
nomic perspective. Since FS remains constant, the number of long-term unem-
ployed persons does not vary. However, UB unambiguously bene￿ts the so far
(before the market intervention) unemployed person, including the long-term
unemployed, since there is no UB at point B (situation after trade liberalization
and without the government). By contrast, the unemployment rate increases
31Note that points A and B represent the trade liberalization simulation without the gov-
ernment￿ s interference as shown above. The black line ￿ starting point A ￿ indicates the
threshold level before trade liberalization. The dashed line ￿ starting from point B ￿ illus-
trates the corresponding values after trade liberalization. Both are just reference lines in order
to rate the policy success. Only the curve shows the simulation result for the RS 1, where the
respective variable is a function of the political parameter s. We will use this exposure also
for redistribution schemes 2 and 3.
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as a consequence of the RS, which harms on average those workers who switch
from employment with the wage rate w0 to unemployment with UB as the new
income. To conclude, the government￿ s action puts those in a better position
who were unemployed at point B, but intensi￿es the negative impact of trade
liberalization on the labor market, i.e. the rising unemployment rate.
Looking at the macroeconomic level, the derived welfare reduction implies
a destruction of trade gains. As illustrated in Figure 2, there is a partially
destruction for relatively low values of s (and hence UB), but if s exceeds the
threshold level s￿
RS1, the gains of trade are completely destroyed.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the government implements UB and chooses the
wage tax for its funding. Then, (i) the FS and the number of long-term unem-
ployed persons remain constant, (ii) the FRW does not vary, (iii) the employ-
ment level decreases and aggregate unemployment rate increases and (iv) the
welfare level declines. If s exceeds a critical threshold, s ￿ s￿
RS1, then the gains
of trade will completely destroyed.
Proof. see text and Figure 2.
5.3.3 RS 2: UB and the payroll tax
If the government implements the UB and chooses the payroll tax as its funding,
we again ￿nd no impact on the FS and on the number of long-term unemployed
persons. Figure 3 reports the simulation results.
Not surprisingly, the e⁄ects are unique. Both UB (due to a rise in the target
real wage) and the payroll tax (due to a decrease in the FRW) forces down the
employment level, which leads to a decrease in output and hence welfare.
At the microeconomic level, the RS bene￿ts the unemployed persons after
trade liberalization, but harms those workers that lose their jobs because of
the government￿ s market interference as before. Furthermore, the FRW shifts
down, which harms the still employed workers who originally bene￿tted from
trade liberalization.
We again ￿nd the gains of trade destruction at the macroeconomic level.
If s is su¢ ciently low, then the trade gains shrink but not fully disappear.
31Figure 3: UB and the payroll tax
If s exceeds the threshold level s￿
RS2, trade gains are completely destroyed in
response to the RS. Notably, s￿
RS2 is lower than s￿
RS1 because of the payroll tax
adds a further negative impact on employment and welfare to the UB e⁄ect,
while the wage tax is neutral as shown above. Thus, RS 2 ampli￿es the gains
of trade destruction.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the government implements the UB and chooses
the payroll tax as its funding. Then, (i) the FS and the number of long-term
unemployed persons remain constant, (ii) the FRW decreases, (iii) the employ-
ment level decreases and aggregate unemployment rate increases and (iv) welfare
decreases. If s exceeds a critical threshold, s ￿ s￿
RS2, then the gains of trade will
completely destroyed. Moreover, s￿
RS2 < s￿
RS1 holds; the trade gains destruction
is ampli￿ed compared to RS 1.
Proof. see text and Figure 3.
5.3.4 RS 3: UB and the pro￿t tax
We now turn to RS 3 where UB are ￿nanced by a pro￿t tax paid by exporters.
Figure 4 reports the simulation results (see blue line). Additionally, we simulate
our model in case of the pro￿t tax is paid by all ￿rms (see blue dotted line).
While we focus on the former, we explore the main di⁄erence between both
cases at the end of this section.
At ￿rst, one important remark. Due to the export cut-o⁄ condition (31),
the maximum value of the pro￿t tax rate is given by ￿1￿￿ = tmax
￿ . If t￿ exceeds
this threshold, no ￿rm, independent of their entrepreneurial productivity, has
an incentive to export ￿tax revenue and UB would be zero. Moreover, we also
see from (31) that if t￿ converges to tmax
￿ , the ratio between e ￿x and e ￿ increases
exponentially. Using (56), our simulation indicates that for s ￿ smax = 0:25,
t￿ is su¢ ciently lower than tmax
￿ to avoid e ￿x ￿ e ￿ and complications from this
unrealistic setting.
Considering the FS, we observe a reduction in average net pro￿t per ￿rm
￿net
t (not illustrated in the ￿gure) and thus a decline in the cut-o⁄ productivity
(see partial analysis). Consequently, the distribution of active ￿rms shifts down
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with two important implications. First, the worker selection e⁄ect becomes
weaker, meaning that there are more ￿rms demanding low-skilled workers. Con-
sequently, the number of long-term unemployed persons decreases. Second, the
average productivity of all domestic ￿rms, e ￿, falls. The reduction in e ￿ yields a
decline in the average productivity of all market active ￿rms, e ￿t. This e⁄ect,
however, is mitigated (but not compensated) by the ES (D > 1).
Looking at the labor market, the case of a negative FS (￿
￿=￿
￿0 < 1 and
e ￿=e ￿
0
< 1) and a positive ES (D > 1) prevails because of the former statements.
We observe two channels. First, the weaker worker selection (lower number of
Ll) and the ES dominates the negative employment e⁄ect resulting from the
decline in the FRW. Thus, the employment level H increases (! < ￿k). Second,
due to the implementation of UB, the fallback income and the unions￿wage
claim enhances, thereby reducing aggregate labor demand H. It is obvious
from Figure 4 that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates for relatively low values of s while
the second e⁄ect dominates otherwise. The results for the unemployment rate
are similar.
Next, we consider output and welfare level. As illustrated in Figure 4, welfare
Y=L decreases. Since we have ! + 1 + ￿ > ￿k in our calibration, the combined
e⁄ect of the decrease in average productivity, in the average ability level and in
the FRW dominates the positive e⁄ect of the weaker worker selection; output
declines. The reduction in Y=L is ampli￿ed by the decline in labor demand due
to the introduction of UB. The positive impact of the ES cannot change the
sign.
33Looking at the distributional consequences at the microeconomic level, the
situation is more complex than it was before. On the one hand, relatively low-
productive ￿rms that now survive on the market are bene￿tted by the market
intervention. Consequently, there are new low-skilled job vacancies, which can
be matched with relatively low-skilled workers. Thus, the number of long-term
unemployed persons shrinks and low-skilled workers getting a job are better
o⁄. On the other hand, decreasing average productivity implies a reduction in
￿rms￿pro￿ts, which harms ￿rms that were already producing before the market
intervention. Furthermore, the still employed workers obtain a loss in terms
of the decreasing FRW. Note that although the employment increase at the
aggregate level for low values of UB, some workers lose their jobs because of the
decreasing FRW and UB. Those workers are thus strictly worsen as explained
above.
In regard to the trade gains at the macroeconomic level, we observe that the
RS continuously decreases welfare and thus the gains of trade. For relatively
low values of s, increasing employment mitigates (but not compensates) the
decrease in average productivity. As a result, trade gains shrink but do not
completely vanish. If s exceeds the threshold level s￿
RS3, trade gains disappear
due to the RS.
Compared to RS 2, we ￿nd that there is again an additional negative impact
through the weaker FS channel (average productivity decreases), but there are
also two positive in￿ uences, namely the increasing labor demand for low-skilled
workers and the ES. Both cannot compensate the former, but they mitigate the
gains of trade destruction in comparison to the payroll tax scenario. However,
the overall negative welfare e⁄ect of the pro￿t tax still ampli￿es the trade gains




Proposition 3 Suppose that the government implements UB and chooses the
pro￿t tax as its funding. Then, (i) the average productivity decreases, (ii) the
number of long-term unemployed persons falls, (iii) the FRW decreases, (iv) the
employment and aggregate unemployment rate reaction is (inverse) u-shaped and
(v) welfare decreases. If s exceeds a critical threshold, s ￿ s￿
RS3, then the gains




trade gains destruction is ampli￿ed compared to RS 1 but mitigated compared to
RS 2.
Proof. see text and Figure 4.
If the pro￿t tax is paid by all ￿rms, ￿
￿
x is independent of t￿ and thus the
ES vanishes (D = 1). As a consequence, the reduction of ￿
￿ becomes relatively
stronger, implying also that the decline in the number of long-term unemploy-
ment increases compared to the former case. However, the hump-shaped reac-
tion of H is smaller because of the decrease in e ￿t is not mitigated from the ES.
For the same reason, the welfare decline and thus the gains of trade destruction
becomes stronger. However, s￿
RS2 < s￿
RS3 < s￿
RS1 is still ful￿lled.
346 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to investigate the implications of di⁄erent RS
by the government as a reaction to the unequal distribution of trade gains. In
particular, we assess their impacts on ￿rm selection, (long-term) unemployment
and welfare using a positive, comparative static analysis. Three RS are distin-
guished: First, the government implements UB ￿nanced by a wage tax. Second,
the government elevates a payroll tax as its funding and third, the government
￿nances UB by a pro￿t tax that is exclusively paid by exporting ￿rms.
Using a Melitz-type model of international trade with unionized labor mar-
kets and heterogeneous workers we show that for the three RS there is a thresh-
old level of UB where all trade gains are destroyed, but this threshold di⁄ers
with the UB funding. The wage tax clearly dominates the others because of its
neutrality. The payroll tax and pro￿t tax ampli￿es the gains of trade destruc-
tion in comparison to the wage tax. However, the latter dominates the former
because the positive impact on low-skilled labor demand. Thus, we obtain an
unequivocal ranking for the chosen funding of the UB: 1. wage tax, 2. pro￿t
tax, 3. payroll tax. The ranking does not change in the special case that all
￿rms pay the pro￿t tax.
Our approach has two limitations. First, welfare is only measured by output
per capita. The empirical evidence, however, shows that trade liberalization
also in￿ uences highly income distribution. Thus, the incorporation of income
distributional aspects in the welfare criteria is needed in future research. Second,
none of our ￿ndings indicates what the government should do in a normative
sense. Hence, the implementation of a government￿ s objective function is a
straightforward extension of our model.
7 Appendix
Appendix A: Government sector
Using (25), we calculate the aggregate UB of long-term unemployed persons:










with ￿(a) = ga(a)=(1 ￿ Ga(a￿)) representing the distribution of abilities con-
ditional on a ￿ a￿, i.e. the ability distribution of active workers. Solving the




uL with ￿3 ￿ k=(k ￿ !).
Using B = Bl + Bu and ul = 1, we obtain the aggregate UB (35).
The wage tax and payroll tax use the aggregate wage income as a tax base,
which is a constant share ￿ of total output because of the mark-up pricing rule.
We immediately get the aggregate tax revenues (36) and (37). The aggregate
















with ￿(￿) = g￿(￿)=(1 ￿ G￿(￿
￿
x)) denoting the productivity distribution of ex-
porting ￿rms. Reformulating (9) and (23) for gross pro￿ts, noting ￿i = ￿ as











































Combining (A1) and (A2) leads to (38).
Appendix B: Derivation of the general equilibrium
For the number of long-term unemployed persons, we use P(a < a￿) =
1 ￿ (a￿)￿k to obtain Ll = (1 ￿ (a￿)
￿k)L. Observing (24), (28) and (33) yields
the number of long-term unemployed persons. Using L = L ￿ Ll, we get the
number of active workers.
To calculate the employment, we combine (45) and (47) to eliminate the
wage. This leads to
1
1 + tw
￿ae ￿t = A
1=!
0 (1 ￿ u(1 ￿ s))1=! ￿ e ￿
￿
t : (B1)
The substituting of (46) into (B1) and rearrangement leads at ￿rst to the
unemployment rate of active workers u. Inserting this result and (49) into
H = (1 ￿ u)L yields the number of employed active workers. By substituting
(40) with (24), (28), (33), (49) and (50) into (40), we obtain u.
Concerning welfare, we choose per capita output Y=L as its measurement.
Aggregate net pro￿ts are used to ￿nance the initial investments fe of ￿rms.
Thus, only the wage income is available for consumption. As mentioned above,
we have W=L = ￿Y=L due to mark-up pricing. Using the technology assumption






L. Observing (46) and (50 as well as Mt=M = 1 + ￿, we get the
measure of welfare.
Finally, we use Y = R = (1 + ￿)Mr(e ￿t) to calculate the number of ￿rms
M: Reformulating (9) as gross pro￿ts and observing ￿(e ￿t) = (D￿￿1 ￿ 1)f, we
obtain r(e ￿t) = D￿￿1f￿, which leads to the number of ￿rms operating in the
market.
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